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UNITARY EXECUTIVE INTERPRETATION:
A COMMENT
Frank H. Easterbrook*
These papers on the "unitariness of executive branch interpreta-
tion" are anything but unitary. The three authors offer distinctive
views of constitutional structure, history, and practice.' From Profes-
sor Miller we receive a Grand Unified Theory integrating public pow-
ers and private liberties. Professor Lessig gives us a refined view of
early practice leading to the conclusion that originalism and the uni-
fied executive are incompatible, in part because the Founders them-
selves were not originalists but respected practical accommodations.
Professor Herz asks how far a government split among agencies can
produce a unified (or sensible) program of regulation.
Despite the great scope of these papers, none tells us what is
either a good structure or the Constitution's actual structure. Each
explicitly postpones these questions to other work; Professor Miller,
for example, tells us that his essay "might perhaps be considered as a
prolegomenon to future research."2 Two hundred six years after the
writing of the Constitution, we are issuing prolegomena-and these
qualified by "might perhaps"!
Might this reticence perhaps reflect the limited content of the
Constitution, or unwillingness to let that content be dispositive? The
Constitution creates the three branches, but aside from laying down a
few rules the founding document leaves to political accommodation
the actual operation of the national government. Searching in the
Constitution for a structure of government, as opposed to boundaries
on the plenitude of possible structures, is an unrewarding task. The
boundaries are few; the living must settle their own affairs. The au-
thors accept this perspective; it accounts for the structure of their
work.
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, The
Law School, The University of Chicago. This Comment on papers presented at Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law's symposium on Executive Branch Interpretation of the Law on No-
vember 15, 1992, is © 1993 by Frank H. Easterbrook.
I See Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 CAR-
DOzO L. REv. 219 (1993); Lawrence Lessig, Readings by Our Unitary Executive, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV. 175 (1993); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Unitary Executive in a Unified Theory of Constitu-
tional Law: The Problem of Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 201 (1993).
2 Miller, supra note 1, at 204.
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Which makes it all the more curious that in working out how the
living should arrange their government to best effect, the authors by-
pass the insights of public choice-the academic discipline concerned
with the consequences of governmental structures. It is a new body of
learning, growing out of relatively recent work by Buchanan, Tullock,
Olson, and Downs. 3 Lawyers have a comparative advantage at un-
derstanding legal rules, but once the subject turns to prudence-to
"good government"-the comparative advantage lies elsewhere. Still,
we can and should be intelligent consumers of this material, which we
can enrich by adding lawyers' insights to social scientists' models. At-
tempts to do this have produced an explosion of helpful papers.4 Any
effort to assess the consequences of particular institutional arrange-
ments must take this scholarship into account. Otherwise we are
mere purveyors of anecdotes, each with a view about what is wise and
good but none with a reason why anyone else should agree.
When lawyers begin to write about executive interpretation, they
turn quickly to litigation-Professor Lessig's paper is almost exclu-
sively about litigation, and the other authors salt their papers with
cases. This might be appropriate if the authors were trying to work
out the boundaries of each department's authority, that core of law
that is enforceable despite the absence of a judicial review clause in
Article III.5 This is not, however, how the authors see litigation.
Professor Miller treats courts as kitchen blenders-appliances into
which one can drop many flavors of interests and arguments and ob-
tain a puree. Such an approach confuses wise government with legiti-
mate government; judges are, or ought to be, concerned only with the
latter.
Professor Lessig, by contrast, treats litigation as a core function
of the executive branch. He has respectable company, but I find it
odd to locate a (maybe the?) central power of the President in an
ability to beg someone with life tenure to enforce the law. Does any-
3 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962);
ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). See
generally DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 (1989); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP C.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
'4 See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM (Bernard Grofman
& Donald Wittman eds., 1989); PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (James
D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988); Conference, The Organization of Political
Institutions, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1990); Symposium, Constitutional Law and Economics, 12
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 123 (1992); Symposium, Positive Political Theory and Public Law, 80
GEO. L.J. 457 (1992); Symposium, The Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988).
5 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 371-80
(1992); Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 919-22
(1989-90).
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one believe that the President's power to propose legislation6 is the
bulwark of the executive branch? No more is the power to ask judges
for assistance. The "executive Power" under the Constitution, in-
cluding the power and duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed," is the power to do, not to ask.7 The President collects
taxes, issues patents, carries the mail, pays the bills, investigates crime
and arrests criminals, patrols the borders, inspects meat, builds high-
ways, launches satellites, decodes enemies' communications, and
sends the Marines. With few exceptions, litigation involving the exec-
utive branch is from the President's perspective damage control-
fending off intrusions by private parties, judges who want to claim a
greater role in government for themselves, and members of Congress
who see that by increasing the role of the judiciary they diminish the
relative influence of their strongest rival, the President. Litigation on
behalf of the polity is shared with private citizens in the United King-
dom and many states (which even, today allow private prosecution),
and the qui tam action, a survivor of the eighteenth century,' shows
that litigation has never been a prerogative confined to executive
officials.
Let me turn, now, to some brief remarks about the particular
papers. Professor Miller invites us to seek a holistic view of the Con-
stitution.9 The community of Founders is no longer with us; we can't
hear the words of the document as those living in 1787 did; the struc-
ture of the entire work therefore is an invaluable source of informa-
tion about the meaning of particular clauses. Structure is an antidote
to tunnel vision. I shall reveal my bias as an adjudicator by asking:
does combining roles (the subject of the 1787 Constitution) with
rights (the subject of many of the amendments from 1789 to date)
offer a useful way to establish limits? A method that offers insight
into sound and humane government does not necessarily tell the polit-
ical branches how they must behave; and if it does not do this, it
contains no information valuable to litigation, which is apparently
where Miller wants to use it.
6 "He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union,
and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedi-
ent." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
7 The first quotation is from U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, and the second from U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 3.
8 See United States ex rel. Kreindler v. United Technologies Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1154-
55 (2d Cir. 1993), which discusses some of the history.
9 In addition to his essay for this symposium, see his Rights and Structure in Constitu-
tional Theory, 8 Soc. PHIL. & POL. 196 (1991).
HeinOnline  -- 15  Cardozo L. Rev.  315 1993 - 1994
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
To have enforceable limits, you need a rule of decision. Without
a rule, there is no legitimate judicial role, no right to insist that other
branches do things in exactly the way judges specify. Recall the ra-
tionale of Marbury; judicial review is an inference from the nature of
the Constitution as law. Professor Miller's project, adding a welter of
considerations and interests to the bones of the structure established
by Articles I, II, and III, detracts from the status of the document as
law. By enlarging the boundaries of the arguable, it diminishes the
legitimate role of adjudication.
In the end, trying to combine all of the clauses of the Constitu-
tion into one bouillabaisse saps the very structure it means to protect.
Our actual Constitution has no Grand Unified Theory."0 Disparate
provisions reflect the compromises of practical people. Powers were
parceled out in order to hold a balance between large and small states,
between free and slave states, between proponents of strong and weak
central government, and so on. The falling out between the Federal-
ists and the Republicans during the Adams administration is a vivid
manifestation of the fact that the Founders did not share a theory of
government. Not even a unified theory, let alone a Grand Unified
Theory, underlies this document. By the time of the Civil War and
the Reconstruction amendments, the United States had undergone a
revolution in the understanding of the relation between the federal
and the state governments, and between the government and the peo-
ple. No complex system adopted by voting, as this was, can be inter-
nally consistent.I'
Now one may say that rules have functions, but they are still
rules rather than manifestations of a single Theory. That the vote to
override a presidential veto is two-thirds of those present, rather than,
say, three-quarters of the full membership, is just a rule. That the
President rather than the Senate names judges reflects the balance of
forces at the Constitutional Convention-a victory of Gouverneur
Morris and other proponents of a strong executive over George Ma-
son and those who preferred a weak executive-not a realization that
one system rather than the other was implied by a single Theory. On
other occasions Mason prevailed. To interpret the assorted, and often
arbitrary, compromises in light of some unified, multifactor Theory is
10 A term imported from physics, where the best minds of the century have so far searched
in vain. Current candidates tackle formidable mathematical problems by multiplying the
number of dimensions. One approach, for example, requires twelve dimensions, eight of which
curled up to sub-atomic size in the first microseconds after the Big Bang. I trust that constitu-
tional theory is not headed in the same direction in order to achieve Unification.
I I This is one of the most profound implications of modern public choice. See KENNETH
J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
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to defeat, by assumption, the actual choice: to have rules of decision,
which govern so far as they go and leave the rest to the future. To
impose a single Theory on each of the provisions aecreted over the
centuries is to change all of the provisions of the real Constitution.' 2
Professor Miller's project encounters trouble even on its own
terms. Consider one of his examples: may the Senate deputize a com-
mittee to receive evidence when trying articles of impeachment re-
ferred by the House? Someone looking at the text of Article I might
ask whether such a procedure is a "trial"; an emphasis on Article III
might lead to the question whether the judicial branch has any role to
play. 13 Miller wants to enlarge the inquiry by adding the core value of
liberty. He asks: does the use of the committee pose a distinct threat
to the liberty of the judge or other public official being tried? All this
additional ingredient yields is indeterminacy. Why should we care
about the liberty of the public official, as opposed to the populace?
Does throwing a senator out of office at the end of six years diminish
his "liberty"? Public office does not exist for the benefit of the incum-
bent; the offices, and the limits on their tenure, are designed for the
benefit of the people. Nothing in the Constitution, or any Grand Uni-
fied Theory of the Constitution, offers so much as a clue about the
interaction of committee structures, tenure of office, and the welfare
or freedom of the whole population. Any aid in answering this ques-
tion must come from outside the Constitution-for example, from the
theory of public choice. Confining attention to the liberty of the per-
son impeached does not improve things. Maybe a committee of
twelve senators will pay more attention to the evidence than would
the full body, wandering in and out. Maybe the availability of a com-
mittee makes impeachment more attractive, because it is not neces-
sary to stop the legislative process to get rid of a wayward district
judge. Are extra removals good (because the House will impeach
only corrupt, lazy, or senile judges?) or bad (because the House will
return to the Nation's beginning and start impeaching judges on polit-
ical grounds, as it did with Justice Samuel Chase)? Would shortening
judges' (effective) tenure aid the population, by cutting down on the
self-indulgence that life tenure facilitates, or harm the public welfare
by undermining judges' willingness to carry out unpopular laws and
constitutional guarantees? Who could tell? And what if it were to
12 Miller's approach has the weakness characteristic of "balancing" and other theories that
exalt indeterminacy and search for possibilities rather than rules. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 972-78, 986-92 (1987); Alex
Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1639 (1993).
13 These are the questions the justices asked in Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732
(1993), issued after the'symposium.
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turn out that the best thing for the people's liberty would be to tie the
Senate in knots hearing impeachments, so that it would enact fewer
bad laws?
Such questions, only the beginning of the sequence necessary to
get a handle on the question using Miller's approach, have no legal
answer. They pose deep issues of politics, philosophy, or utility the-
ory. The only thing of which I am sure is that even pursuing this
Grand Unified approach dishonors the one rule the Constitution
surely establishes: that senators rather than judges are entitled to have
the final word. Impeachment is a check on the judicial and executive
branches. It is designed to protect the public from wicked, or impe-
rial, judges. Such a device, a counterweight to tenure during good
behavior, is defeated if judges claim the final word on the propriety of
its use. The Constitution is untidy. A Senate with the final word may
abuse its power; but then judges, if they have the final word, may
abuse theirs. Which actor's word is final cannot be teased out of a
Grand Unified Theory. For this you need a more particularistic set of
rules.
Second example: Professor Miller is having second thoughts
about independent agencies. A few years back he put them under a
constitutional pall; 4 now he suggests that specialization, energy, and
the avoidance of faction give agencies a new purchase in a Grand Uni-
fied Theory. 5 The model implicit in Miller's treatment is of an
agency, free from political influence, fearlessly carrying out the law
wherever it leads. This is a more romantic view than I anticipated
from this careful student of interest-group politics. As his previous
scholarly work shows, agencies have their own agendas. It is not sim-
ply that they become the captive of factions (or even are created to
serve these groups). Agencies start pursuing their own agendas, with
tunnel vision adherence to the goal of their statute at the expense of
other, equally worthy objectives. Eliminating the President from the
process does not make the agency stronger. Commissioners of the
XYZ Agency have no power of their own. They can't threaten to
veto a bill; they lack access to the levers that facilitate logrolling (no
commissioner can promise a member of the House to sponsor a new
dam in exchange for his vote on a proposed change to the copyright
law); having access only to the trade press (that is, to the interest
group press), they can't take their case to a national constituency.
What then is going on? An independent, which is to say a weaker,
agency increases the relative strength of Congress. Subcommittee
14 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SuP. CT. REV. 41.
15 See Miller, supra note 1, at 210.
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chairmen can dictate to commissioners in a way they cannot to secre-
taries of cabinet departments.1 6 Chairmen of committees and sub-
committees are, on average, farther from the median of national
opinion than are presidents, with their broader constituencies; chair-
men have less constitutional license to govern (after all, the Constitu-
tion calls on Congress as an institution to legislate, not on single
members to browbeat commissioners at hearings). James Madison
and his colleagues got it right in prescribing a strong executive as an
antidote to the baleful influence of faction. Once again the Grand
Unified Theory takes us farther from the real Constitution.
A general equilibrium theory of politics, like a Grand Unified
Theory of physics,17 is well worth seeking but eludes us, and is likely
to continue eluding us. Scholars properly devote their lives to these
pursuits, but the actual operation of the government depends on the
few rules in the Constitution and the ability of practical people to
muddle through.
Professor Lessig offers us an historical project more along the
Founders' lines. He is entirely convincing in demonstrating the mess-
iness of the original conception and practice (a messiness that, by the
way, is one reason why Grand theories can't be Unified). The Fram-
ers took practice as seriously as they took text; so too must we.
Still, I do not believe that this recognition puts a big dent in the
Unitarians' armor, for several reasons. First, litigation is not a core
executive function. Second, none of the examples Lessig mines from
our history excluded the President utterly, as some modem statutes
do." Unitarians making textual claims need not cower. Not claims
based on the "take Care" clause, which is too general to carry much
freight, but more specific claims. In historical terms, an independent
counsel (i.e., a special prosecutor) is not an "inferior" officer, and
therefore cannot be appointed by a court of law. History and the
structure of the Constitution reveal that "inferior officers" and "infer-
ior courts" are subordinate institutions, not "unimportant" ones. A
public official without an immediate superior thus must be appointed
by the President; the lesson of history fortifies rather than undercuts
this kind of textual claim.
Unitarians making structural rather than textual claims also sur-
vive unscathed. Judicial review depends not on the text but on the
16 Again an implication of public choice, and with data to back it up. See, e.g., Roger L.
Faith et al., Antitrust Pork Barrel, 25 J.L. & ECON. 329 (1982).
17 Or, as Douglas Adams would put it: Life, the Universe, and Everything.
18 1 have in mind the independent counsel legislation, the idea of which is to reduce the
executive's role to the smallest feasible extent. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
1993]
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structure of the Constitution, so long as we understand the Constitu-
tion as law rather than (as Bismark cracked about war) as politics by
other means. Intergovernmental tax immunities, state immunities
from damages actions at common law, the foreign relations power of
the President, and many other features of our constitutional order are
inferences from the structure of the document (and the government it
established) rather than interpretations of textual passages. Deriving
power (and limits on power) from structure is an essential feature of
the early practice that Lessig extols. Recall that John Marshall ad-
duced structural rather than textual arguments in the two cases that
establish the allocation of powers we still accept: Marbury v. Madison
(which established judicial review) and McCulloch v. Maryland
(which treated the Necessary and Proper Clause as a grant of power
to Congress rather than a limit on legislative power).19 How far infer-
ences from structure extend is one of the most delicate questions of
interpretation, but the enterprise is reinforced rather than under-
mined by an understanding of our constitutional history.2"
Having devoted my attention to Grand theory and constitutional
foundations, I have only a few words to offer about Professor Herz's
admirable description of contemporaneous practice. It is good to be
brought down to earth by concrete examples. And Professor Herz
surely is right in concluding that the executive branch may construe
statutes; construction is an essential precursor to faithful execution.
(Trying to implement a law before interpreting it could hardly be
called "faithful.")
Where within the executive does the power of interpretation be-
long?, Professor Herz asks. To the President, or to the agency (in this
case the EPA, a line rather than "independent" agency)? Herz con-
cludes that the logical arguments are a wash, because either may seek
to implement a private agenda or take a position at variance with the
law.21 If one is inclined to do too little in the name of the law, the
other may seek to do too much. If the agency head is apt to be cap-
tured by the staff (the "Yes, Minister" phenomenon), the President is
apt to be distracted by the rush of affairs and have insufficient time to
choose wisely (or at all).
I have no quarrel with this analysis in its own terms. But is Pres-
ident vs. Agency the right comparison? Again principles of public
19 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819).
20 See also Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992).
21 See Herz, supra note 1, at 264.
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choice come into play, and the comment about Professor Miller's pa-
per is apropos: the contest is more likely to be Subcommittee Chair-
man vs. Congress (or Congress plus the President), or Chairman vs.
Executive, with the agency as a pawn. Effective separation of the leg-
islative and executive power, designed to dull the influence of faction,
implies giving the interpretive power to the person with the broadest
base and the strongest political weapons. Shortage of presidential
time means that the President needs coordinating instruments (such
as the Office of Legal Counsel for law and the Office of Management
and Budget for policy) and that these tools must be strong and in-
dependent of Congress to serve their function.
These three intriguing papers have much to teach us. But we will
learn still more if we carefully respect the distinction between consti-
tutional boundaries and wise choices within these boundaries. Most
of today's difficult questions are of the latter kind. Political philoso-
phy, public choice, and practical experience have more to offer than
do strictly legal rules. Our world differs greatly from the world of the
founding. Sagacious as they were, the Framers did not anticipate tele-
phones, jet travel, and the many other changes that by shrinking the
effective size of the United States have transformed the relation be-
tween federal and state governments, and expanded the domain of the
commerce power. Madison, who in Federalist No. 10 so clearly saw
the dangers of majority factions, did not foresee the strength of mi-
nority factions in a republic made smaller by changes in technology.
One element of his insight survives: a unitary executive is better at
faction control than are scattered legislators and agencies. In the end,
the champions of a unitary executive were more right than they knew.
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